Curriculum vitae

Fanelli Angelo

Chargé de recherche CNRS
LAMSADE

angelo.fanelliping@dauphine.pslpong.eu
Tel : +393884628047
Site web personnel

Biographie

 

Education

  • 2009.  Ph.D. in Computer Science, Dept. of Computer Science, University of L’Aquila, Italy
  • 2005.  M.s. in Computer Science, Dept. of Computer Science, University of L’Aquila, Italy

 

Appointments 

  • May '22 - present. Researcher (CRN) - CNRS, LAMSADE, Université Paris Dauphine-PSL, Paris, France
  • Oct. '12 - Apr. '22. Researcher (CRN) - CNRS, CREM, Université de Caen Normandie, Caen, France
  • Oct. '09 - Oct. '12. Research Fellow - Division of Mathematical Sciences, SPMS, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
  • Apr. '09 - Sep. '09. Research Fellow - Lehrstuhl für Informatik I (Algorithms and Complexity), RWTH Aachen University, Germany
  • Jan. '09 - Mar. '09. Research Assistant - Lehrstuhl für Informatik I (Algorithms and Complexity), RWTH Aachen University, Germany

 

Research Interest

My research interests lie in the area of Optimization, Computational Complexity and Game Theory with applications in AI 

 

Selected Publications

I. Caragiannis, A. Fanelli. On approximate pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games with polynomial latencies.  Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 117: 40-48, 2021

E. Elkind,  A. Fanelli, M. Flammini. Price of Pareto optimality in hedonic games. Artificial Intelligence, 288: 103357, 2020

I. Caragiannis, A. Fanelli. An almost ideal coordination mechanism for unrelated machine scheduling. Theory of Computing Systems, 63(1): 114-127, 2019

V. Auletta, A. Fanelli, D. Ferraioli. Consensus in opinion formation processes in fully evolving environments. 33th Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2019 

V. Bilò, A. Fanelli, M. Flammini, G. Monaco, L. Moscardelli. Nash stable outcomes in fractional hedonic games: existence, efficiency and computation. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 62: 315-371, 2018 

I. Caragiannis, A. Fanelli, N. Gravin, A. Skopalik. Approximate pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games: Existence, efficient computation, and structure. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 3(1): 2, 2015 

I. Caragiannis, A. Fanelli, N. Gravin, A. Skopalik. Efficient computation of approximate pure Nash equilibria in congestion games.  52nd Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS 2011

Link to DBLP

Link to Mendeley

Link to Google Scholar 

 

Contacts

Institutional Email  angelo DOT fanelli AT cnrs DOT fr

Personal Email  angelo DOT fanelli AT gmail DOT com

Office  Université Paris Dauphine-PSL, Paris, France 

 

 

Dernières publications

Prépublications / Cahiers de recherche

Fanelli A., Fotakis D. (2022), On (approximate) pure Nash equilibria in preference games, Paris, Preprint Lamsade

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